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Introduction
In its broadest sense corporate governance addresses two issues; the philosophy of accountability 
evidenced towards stakeholders and the presence of a management framework that ensures the 
effective and efficient supervision of an organization (McNamee and Fleming 2007). As such its 
principal aim is to ensure that high standards of corporate behaviour are retained and the activi-
ties an organization undertakes are ethical and transparent. Consequently, corporate governance 
describes all the influences affecting how an organization executes its business, including those 
for appointing the controllers and regulators charged with organizing the production and sale 
of goods and services (Ansell and Gash, 2008).
Of course, viewed in these terms, corporate governance includes all types of businesses 
whether they are officially incorporated or otherwise. The Gaelic Athletic Association 
(GAA), Ireland’s largest sporting body, as an unincorporated entity, is not mandated to 
abide by the provisions governing the best practice in the corporate world. Nevertheless, it 
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Within global sport it appears the effective management of the 
interdependency of national governing bodies, individual clubs and a 
network of stakeholder interests has never been more widely discussed. 
It points to a requirement for all sporting organizations to remain 
sensitive to what is an ever-growing dichotomy between sporting 
volunteers and professional salaried staff, their competing interests 
and objectives. It is by no means a straightforward undertaking and 
is particularly foregrounded in a sporting environment that attaches 
significance to the preservation of an amateur ideal. As many sports 
clubs are now faced with the challenge of offering an adequate forum 
through which to reflect the views of their grassroots members, whilst 
simultaneously facilitating greater commercial interest in their affairs, 
the fundamental changes facing Ireland’s largest sporting body, the 
Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA), offers cause for timely reflection. 
This article argues that only through the introduction of a meaningful 
stakeholder model can the governance of an organization like the 
GAA, a social and cultural touchstone unmatched within Irish sporting 
life, begin to respond to these mounting and competing agendas.
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could be argued that many examples of good practice emerging from the field of business 
can and should be adopted by all large organizations, including those, like the GAA, oper-
ating in the sporting realm.
Within Great Britain and Ireland, stewardship theory is the bedrock upon which most 
company law is founded. It requires that an individual behaves as if s/he was the principal 
of the organization and not merely an agent. Of course the willingness of an individual to 
act as a selfless steward is tied closely to the cultural expectations evident within the respec-
tive business (sporting) field. The particular cultural norms and values underpinning the 
activities of the GAA though make this model an ideal one for the effective regulation and 
strategic future of the indigenous body, which has over 1 million members in Ireland and 
even more amongst the Irish Diaspora living everywhere from Sydney to San Francisco.
In the realm of modern sport, the GAA remains something of a cherished entity. An 
organization founded upon the principles of amateurism and self-sufficiency, it is sustained 
by an unselfish sense of altruism. It is best described as a ‘volunteer led’ sporting body, one 
that is understood as ‘membership owned’, even if its success has almost necessitated the 
appointment of a professional management infrastructure to sustain its continued growth. 
This issue, in fact, goes to the very heart of this article – how do sporting organizations 
around the world satisfactorily manage the competing demands, expectations and views of 
an overwhelmingly volunteer membership, upon whom–in the case of the GAA–the entire 
association’s infrastructure depends, with an ever more corporate approach to its business 
in which the principles of neo-liberalism seemingly hold considerable sway. The latter 
therefore is increasingly subject to the heightened expectations placed upon it by a form 
of ‘stakeholder governance’, defined by the positioning of sport for non-sporting, indeed 
largely commercial, outcomes.
As such the traditional hierarchical system of sporting authority has come under increas-
ing pressure, mirroring developments in wider policy-making arenas. ‘Governance’ has 
been redefined as ‘a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process 
of governing’ (Clarkson, 1995, 31). It is argued that this manifests itself through deci-
sion-making networks rather than direct control and an increase in the number of actors 
in the policy-making process. Henry and Lee (2004) have similarly referred to the notion 
of ‘systematic governance’ in which the,
old hierarchical model of the government of sport, the top-down system, has given way to a 
complex web of interrelationships between stakeholders in which different groups exert power 
in different ways and in different contexts by drawing upon alliances with other stakeholders. 
(Henry and Lee 2004, 24)
In this respect, the concept of ‘network’ governance provides an appropriate starting point 
from which to assess the changing nature of control within the GAA. Within the context of 
elite-level competition, the GAA has had to re-evaluate its relationships with stakeholders 
who are both part of the GAA sphere (its clubs, wider membership and various levels of 
management) and external stakeholders with the power to influence (such as the institutions 
of the State, the increasing media interest in its affairs and wider developments in civic 
life). If control within the GAA now occurs through a network of influence, as appears to 
be widely understood, then it is important to appreciate how that network operates as the 
breakdown of influence will necessarily impact upon the achievement of ‘good governance’ 
in the management of Ireland’s foremost sporting body. In the context of the administra-
tion of the association, this relates directly to the management of revenue (including its 
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maximization), the role of non-salaried ‘priority’ members (specifically its elite players 
and managers) and the strategic direction of the GAA in an evolving Irish society where, 
amongst other concerns, a changing work–life balance and the appeal of global sports are 
prime considerations for its volunteer-base. Ultimately, an understanding of the GAA gov-
ernance network, and in a wider sense the challenges faced by a mutually owned sporting 
body, can be gleaned through analysis of the different dimensions of power and the ebb 
and flow of the association’s transition from a wholly amateur body to the management of 
one in which the primary means of revenue generation (the elite game) appears to fund 
what some still regard as an over inflated central operation at danger of losing touch with 
its volunteer base.
Sport governance
Indeed, in an overarching sense, the sport industry continues to evolve into an evermore 
professional and commercial entity and, in line with these changes, we are witness to a 
number of interesting phenomena taking hold within the broad field of sport governance. 
A previous, comparatively basic, need for governance in a largely volunteer led and wholly 
amateur context has now evolved into a requirement to adopt a full range of functions and 
practices synonymous with the corporate or traditional non-profit sectors. Within the con-
temporary non-profit sporting environment specifically, which best describes the context 
in which the GAA exists, this has led to tensions between volunteers and the influx of paid 
staff within the industry and has often resulted in conflict between member–stakeholders 
and representatives of sporting bodies (Shilbury and Ferkins 2014). Similar issues have also 
emerged in the for-profit or professional sports governance domain where members and 
fans of professional clubs and organizations have expressed dissatisfaction with the manner 
in which their organization is being governed, often leading to calls for wholesale structural 
changes in the governance systems in place within such clubs.
Alongside the issues outlined here, the question of governance within sports gener-
ally is receiving a significant increase in attention within industry and academia over 
recent times. This may be attributed to the growing number of high-profile incidents 
of alleged malpractice within sport and similar accusations of corruption, which con-
tinue to define some sectors and organizations within the industry. Although govern-
ance deficiencies are mostly reported in mainstream media only when they involve 
high-profile figures, governance is not an area of sport scholarship solely  reserved 
for such individuals or the organizations they are affiliated with. Rather governance 
is a necessary and institutionalized component of all sporting codes from club level 
to national bodies, government agencies, sport service organizations and professional 
teams around the world (Ferkins and Shilbury 2010). The term is often cited in the sin-
gular perspective, where one organization’s governance practices are brought into sharp 
contrast. This is often referred to simply as corporate or organizational governance 
(O’Boyle and Shilbury 2016; Shilbury, Ferkins, and Smythe 2013). However, governance 
also encapsulates networks of sport organizations, such as those that operate within 
the non-profit domain, which in turn are often affiliated with regional, national and 
indeed international governing bodies. This concept is generally defined as systemic, 
networked or federated governance within the extant literature (Henry and Lee 2004).
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Regardless of the type of governance that is being discussed, one aspect of this field of 
enquiry is clear; governance coheres around the work of the board within a sport organ-
ization and their on-going responsibility in ensuring their organization is performing at 
an optimum level, is in tune with the body’s key trading objectives and is operating in an 
efficient and effective manner (O’Boyle 2012). Hoye and Cuskelly (2007) suggest that the 
board must establish ‘a direction or overall strategy to guide the organization and ensure that 
organizational members have some say in how that strategy is developed and articulated’ 
(10). The latter is best preserved through a form of mutual ownership or at least the creation 
of a democratic setting in which grassroots members can exercise their opinions. They add 
that the board should also control the activities of the organization, its members and staff 
so that individuals act in the best interests of the organization and are working towards an 
agreed strategic direction. There is general consensus that one of the fundamental roles of 
the board within any sport organization is to act in such a strategic manner and thereby 
demonstrate its overall strategic capability (Ferkins and Shilbury 2012).
Governance in non-profit sport
This focus on the strategic function of the board, alongside its many other roles, has been 
the primary field of enquiry within a number of studies in the non-profit sport governance 
domain (Inglis 1997; O’Boyle and Hassan 2014; Shilbury 2001; Yeh and Taylor 2008; Yeh, 
Hoye, and Taylor 2011). Other areas that have received attention, specifically within the 
non-profit sporting setting, include volunteer motivations for serving as a board member, 
board performance and CEO-–Chairperson relationships (Cuskelly and Boag 2001; Hoye 
and Doherty 2011; Inglis 1997; Shilbury and Ferkins 2011; Soares, Correia, and Rosado 
2010). These studies have been important additions to this field of study and have assisted 
our understanding of the intricacies of sport governance challenges that the industry faces 
and how they may be best overcome. To coincide with studies published in the academic 
arena, there have also been a number of industry reports that have sought to highlight the 
challenges associated with effective governance practices and potentially illustrate some-
thing of a ‘best practice’ approach for sport organizations amidst general acknowledgement 
that each organization can face distinct pressures and challenges in respect of their organ-
izational capacity (ASC 2013; SPARC 2006; UK Sport 2004).
The most recent high-profile industry report addressing sport governance in the non-
profit context has been published by the Australian Sports Commission (ASC) and has 
placed a responsibility on Australia’s sporting organizations (both national and regional) to 
address real and perceived governance deficiencies within their sports. This report, entitled 
Mandatory Sports Governance Principles (2013), requires all ASC-funded bodies to comply 
with the principles therein or risk a reduction in funding from this government agency in 
subsequent years. Within the report the ASC states:
… the time is now here to raise the bar, recognising that organizations that are managing public 
investment and member interests must have structures in place that reflect a greater level of 
professionalism. This is true whether a national sporting organization (NSO) is focused on 
high performance or participation. Good governance is a necessary condition for success. (1)
The ASC (2013) report appears to capture the major issues facing contemporary sport 
 organizations in relation to their governance, and is a relevant departure point not only 
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for organizations operating within the Australian context, but also for those existing inter-
nationally in both non-profit and even, in some instances, within the for-profit sporting 
environment. The report is delineated into three distinct sections, each focussing upon a 
multitude of governance challenges; structure for sport; board composition and operation; 
and sport transparency, reporting and integrity.
The first section, structure for sport, refers to the complex issue of ensuring all affiliated 
organizations that comprise a sporting network are working towards a common strategic 
vision and direction, with a shared understanding across the sport. This has been one of the 
major challenges within the non-profit sporting context in recent times, where often wholly 
autonomous organizations at regional levels are expected to collaborate and cooperate for 
‘whole of sport’ progression, led by a NSO. This governance issue has also been the focus of 
a limited amount of academic work, which has investigated how such a sporting network 
can ensure that all federated bodies are working cohesively and towards such common 
strategic outcomes (Henry and Lee 2004; O’Boyle and Shilbury 2016; Shilbury, Ferkins, 
and Smythe 2013).
This federal system of sport governance operates similarly in a host of countries through-
out the world, including New Zealand, Canada, the UK and a number of other European 
nation states. When exploring governance issues within federal models, Shilbury, Ferkins, 
and Smythe (2013) highlight a series of concerns surrounding these types of networks. 
These include questions about the suitability of federal models to facilitate a whole of sport 
perspective, how barriers to collaboration may be overcome and what role leadership plays 
within governance positions in a federal sporting network. O’Boyle and Shilbury (2016) 
build on this work when examining the issue of trust within governance networks and 
have uncovered that pre-histories of conflict and antagonism, and low levels of mutuality 
between federated bodies was significantly, and adversely, impacting upon the governance 
function of the sports examined in their research. They also noted that increasing the fre-
quency of face-to-face dialogue between boards in a sporting network and intentionally 
seeking to become more transparent in decision-making processes could, in turn, elevate 
levels of trust and therefore collaboration within these systems. Also, coinciding with the 
findings of Shilbury, Ferkins, and Smythe (2013) and previous work in the public admin-
istration domain undertaken by Ansell and Gash (2008), it was found that effective lead-
ership built on an ability to negotiate and communicate effectively was imperative when 
fostering high-level working relationships and facilitating horizontal cooperation within 
sport governance networks.
As commentators from both industry and academia begin to afford increased attention 
to ‘structures of sport’ in relation to governance, this area of ‘collaborative governance’ 
may play an increasingly important role in how we view and understand the relationship 
between various bodies that are required to work together within these governance sys-
tems. Previous studies, outlined above, have typically adopted theoretical frameworks from 
more established fields of enquiry and these theoretical underpinnings have, at times, had 
particular relevance to the federal model of sport governance. For instance, institutional 
theory, resource dependence theory, agency theory, inter-organizational relationships and 
network theory have all been adopted by researchers in this field and have provided useful 
results and insights (Dickson, Arnold, and Chalip 2005; Ferkins and Shilbury 2010; Henry 
and Lee 2004; Hoye and Cuskelly 2007; O’Boyle and Bradbury 2013; O’Boyle and Hassan 
2016). An important recent addition to the suite of theoretical frameworks that has been 
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applied within the field is the theory of collaborative governance (O’Boyle and Shilbury 
2016; Shilbury and Ferkins 2014). Collaborative governance theory has its origins within 
public sector administration and until recently studies relating to this position have largely 
been based within this sector and emerged predominantly from the US (Ansell and Gash 
2008; Emerson, Nabatchi, and Balogh 2012). It has been proposed that this theory has par-
ticular relevance to the federal model of sport governance as it is an arrangement in which 
wholly independent bodies are brought together to engage in a ‘collective decision-making 
process that is formal, consensus-orientated, and deliberative’ (Ansell and Gash 2008, 544).
Governance in professional sport
Notwithstanding the importance of governance within federal networks, and indeed that 
of boards operating within these environments (as previously described), governance in 
this domain is limited to those organizations that operate on a non-profit basis and many 
face different challenges and pressures when compared to those sporting bodies that exist 
in a more profit driven environment, as witnessed in a number of professional sporting 
leagues throughout the world. Examples include many of the professional soccer leagues 
operating in Europe and, of course, the dominant American sports systems. Within the US 
specifically, although federalism defines the nation’s political make-up, a reflection of this 
federal system is absent from the sports environment with a significant disconnect between 
mass participation sport and professional sport is evidenced. The combination of a federalist 
system of government and an avowedly free-market economy has resulted in a plethora of 
sport organizations claiming governance over the same sport (Green, Chalip, and Bowers 
2013). Furthermore, the lack of a nationalized governance framework within all sports in 
the US has created an opening for entrepreneurs who own professional sport franchises 
and who control the leagues in which that team compete. These groups and individuals 
can present their teams and leagues in any manner they see fit, with the only regulation to 
ensure that these activities do not contravene American business law. Consequently, each 
of the major leagues in the US, such as the National Basketball Association (NBA), National 
Football League (NFL) and Major League Baseball (MLB), have their own rules and systems 
of governance, even if they do appear to operate in a broadly complimentary fashion.
Taking the NFL as an example of the contrast between governance in the traditional 
non-profit and for-profit sporting environments, it is clear to witness the contrast in the 
challenges facing these alternative governance systems. The NFL is a private and wholly 
for-profit enterprise. The mission of the organization is: ‘To present the National Football 
League and its teams at a level that attracts the broadest audience and makes NFL football 
the best sports entertainment in the world’ (NFL 2015). Much like a traditional corporate 
entity, the league is overseen by a Commissioner (equivalent to CEO) who reports to the 
Executive Committee (equivalent to a board) with ultimate responsibility for the welfare of 
the league (note the emphasis on the product as opposed to the sport). A delegate system 
of board composition predominates with representation from each of the 32 NFL teams. 
League policies are brought into effect based on a three-quarters majority of team owners 
with the overwhelming number of teams owned by individuals or a private corporation, who 
present a remarkably similar profile of sporting venture capitalism. In contrast to non-profit 
sporting networks, where members at grassroots level are often referred to as the ‘owners’ 
of the sport, this stakeholder group is largely absent from the governance systems that 
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operate in such professional sporting networks. Corporate governance within these types 
of professional leagues generally involves the adoption of a shareholder perspective – that 
is to maximize the economic performance of the teams (Senaux 2008).
This is not to imply that all professional sport is governed in a manner that directly 
mirrors the NFL. Within the English Premier League (EPL), for instance, a more free mar-
ket-orientated system exists, which has been described accurately by Amara et al. (2005) as 
‘neo liberal’. Contrasting the NFL and the EPL cases, Gratton and Taylor (2000) described 
the NFL system as involving much greater intervention and where media rights incomes are 
shared across the network, recruitment strategies are policed through the draft pick system 
whilst entry into the market is monopolized by the league itself, where a limited number 
of franchises exists and rare instances of expansion remain. These ‘equalisation’ measures 
are in large part designed to protect the key principle of ‘uncertainty of outcome’ to sustain 
interest in the league from fans and, by extension, the broadcast media (Amara et al. 2005). 
In contrast, the EPL has seen a wide disparity in the income levels of those teams at the top 
and bottom of its league over recent times and has led to somewhat of a reduction in the 
uncertainty of outcome within the regular season. Although Gratton (2000) suggests that 
there is a lack of empirical evidence to argue that the EPL should adopt a more ‘equalised’ 
approach, there have been suggestions that a European wide league (distinct from the 
existing UEFA Champions League) with limited entry could be established, as the various 
national leagues throughout the continent become evermore predictable and thereby risk 
the possibility of spectator interest waning over time (Szymanski and Hoehn 1999).
Remaining with the example of the NFL and indeed other professional sport in the USA, 
the corporate governance nature of these teams and leagues is, as suggested, ultimately to 
protect the value of the shareholder in every respect. In contrast to this shareholder per-
spective, the non-profit sporting environment can be understood as adopting a stakeholder 
view – and indeed some scholars have argued that a number of ‘for profit’ professional teams 
and leagues also adopt this perspective (Foreman 2006; Senaux 2008).
The concept of a stakeholder, and the development of the stakeholder model, are attrib-
uted to Freeman’s seminal publication: ‘Strategic Management: A stakeholder approach’ 
(1984). He suggested that the stakeholder is ‘any group or individual who can affect or 
is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives’ (46). Further definitions 
and descriptions of stakeholders have been offered by numerous other scholars, including 
Clarkson (1995), who labelled stakeholders as individuals or groups who have put something 
at risk in their relationship with the organization. Both definitions detailed here evidently 
rely upon high levels of dependency between organizations and their stakeholders. However, 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) also add that it is important to establish a clear contrast 
between ‘true stakeholders’ and those that simply influence the organization. The media, 
for example, may influence the actions of a sport organization but one could argue are not 
stakeholders in the truest sense of the word. Supporters, players, coaches, administrators and 
competitors, on the other hand, are more closely linked to the definition of a stakeholder 
from a sporting perspective.
This stakeholder perspective has its roots in the history of European sport, from which the 
majority of professional teams today have evolved after originally being developed as ‘sport-
ing associations’, in contrast to the pathway developed by professional sport in the USA. 
Although professional sport in Europe also now reflects a strong emphasis on economic 
activity, as one might expect, ‘there are still deep heritages which profoundly structured 
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the organization of sport in Europe and somehow explain the existence of complex power 
games’ (Senaux 2008, 67) between professional sport and its stakeholders. The stakeholder 
perspective in relation to sport governance is therefore relevant to professional sport in this 
respect where there may be a variety of interests and goals competing, and in conflict, with 
each other. Of course shareholders also exist in professional sport throughout Europe and 
therefore cannot be overlooked in any analysis of corporate governance in a professional 
sport setting. Much like their counterparts in the USA, shareholders can have a number 
of interests and agendas as capital owners within the organization (but not necessarily 
owners of the organization itself). These interests may include financial returns, reputation, 
self-promotion and indeed the ‘on field’ success of the organization as a result of a sporting 
passion. One could assume that the interests of shareholders in professional sport are often 
mixed and not necessarily explicit. Nonetheless, they clearly remain an integral aspect of 
the governance structure.
There are other primary stakeholders, of course, in professional sport from players, 
coaches, administrators, supporters and various sporting bodies that impact on the activ-
ities of this unique business field. Players, in particular, have become an important group 
within the stakeholder model of sport governance as player associations and lobbying groups 
continue to exert an ever-increasing influence on the manner in which professional sport, 
indeed the same may be true of amateur organizations like the GAA, is presented and gov-
erned. Something similar can be said for supporters groups who, in some instances, have 
even assumed capital ownership positions within professional sporting teams. Senaux (2008) 
suggested that this focus on players, as an exclusive stakeholder group, risks the alienation of 
other stakeholder groups who may prove equally significant but perhaps remain less visible. 
This array of stakeholders makes professional sport an interesting context within which to 
examine corporate governance, especially in respect of the so-called European model of 
sport. Furthermore, within the non-profit sporting environment it is accepted, with little 
dissent, that the owners of sport in these systems are the members or the grassroots com-
munity involved in a given sport. The entities that comprise the governance framework in 
non-profit sport are seen as ‘service organizations’ to their members in this respect.
It is this issue therefore that continues to define many of the challenges faced by the 
largest sporting body (in terms of membership and asset base) in Ireland: the GAA. At the 
turn of the new millennium this organization, founded in 1884, appeared to be at some-
thing of a crossroads. Its dilemma was clear – it wished to remain wedded to the principle 
of amateurism (operationally understood as its players, managers and members continu-
ing to give of their services free of charge) but recognized that significant elements of the 
association belied this sense of honest, voluntary endeavour and, instead, pointed towards 
an increasingly professionalised and commercial future for the sporting body. Many of its 
key personnel were in salaried positions, it owned a stadium (Croke Park) that was the 
envy of many within European sport, and its leading games were regularly sold out having 
already attracted more than 82,000 spectators. It was the core question of how to offer the 
effective governance of a sporting body seemingly committed to two competing objectives 
– the retention of a long-standing model of ‘mutual ownership’ and involvement whilst at 
the same time accepting the reality of just how significant the organization had become in 
commercial terms – that was in the minds of the GAA’s leading officers when it published 
its seminal Strategic Review document in 2002.
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Gaelic Athletic Association
Those behind the publication of the GAA’s Strategic Review were clearly concerned at the 
way in which the organization was being managed, which was at best inefficient, and made 
specific recommendations on how it might undergo much needed transformation. It rec-
ommended that ‘Coiste Bainisti (the Management Committee of the GAA) should prepare 
its proposals in respect of governance, and these should be set out in a document formally 
approved by Central Council’ (GAA Strategic Review, 2002, 161). The GAA’s Management 
Committee is concerned with the day-to-day running of the association. It is at this level 
that rules and regulations governing the affairs of the GAA are ratified and, if appropriate, 
implemented. It is also considered good practice under these arrangements to appoint 
an audit committee to monitor the implementation of such proposals. In most cases, the 
audit committee would also contain an independent person, someone with the requisite 
expertise, to provide additional assurances to the network of stakeholders, not least the 
GAA membership, of the continued practices of the organization.
The strategic review report went further in providing detailed recommendations on 
how the difficult matters of remuneration and performance were to be handled within the 
GAA. As the GAA is an organization founded upon its amateur ethos the issue of finance 
has always been one with which it has experienced particular difficulty. Indeed the question 
of commerce reflects a clear distinction between the GAA’s central operation and its mem-
bership ‘on the ground’. A view exists that the former has access to considerable amounts 
of money, whereas the latter is comparatively less well off and indeed is struggling to meet 
many of its on-going financial commitments. The review body was intent on reflecting the 
concerns of many rank and file members regarding an apparent self-regulating, relatively 
autonomous body in which the issue of accountability was never made entirely transparent. 
Instead, drawing upon examples of the best practice in the corporate and semi-state sectors, 
the review body made specific reference to the remuneration of executive officers at central 
level and the need for these to be kept under continual review by a separate committee. This 
committee may also be involved in compiling criteria for evaluating ‘performance’ for the 
ever-growing body of full-time employees within the GAA. The inference was clear; that 
any GAA policy on governance was either unfit for purpose or that one simply did not exist.
The mechanisms through which the wider GAA membership, not to mention its com-
mercial stakeholders, are integrated into the decision-making process, remain equally dated. 
One general meeting each year, referred to as the GAA’s Annual Congress, constitutes the 
sole occasion when those who govern the association can be adequately held to account. 
Even then much of the discussion that takes place at this meeting is pre-established as 
delegates are obliged to forward motions for debate, many of which are deferred or ruled 
out of order, often on account of some technical minutia. The picture remains one of an 
operating environment in which very little effective cross-examination of those in positions 
of authority within the GAA can take place. It makes for a less than satisfactory state of 
affairs for the majority of GAA members.
The lack of commercial awareness was equally unsettling for the review committee who 
recommended that the GAA’s annual report ‘should outline the (Central) Council’s respon-
sibility for the preparation of the financial statements and include a representation on the 
applicability of the ‘Going Concern’ basis for the preparation of the financial statements, 
with supporting assumptions and qualifications, as necessary’ (GAA, 2000). It is against this 
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backdrop that wider concerns about the GAA’s capacity to cope properly with its increasing 
commercial workload are being raised. As McGee comments:
Nobody can blame the GAA for maximising its financial returns which have come about from 
money well spent on developing grounds, coaching, etc., over many years. But lots of GAA 
people are worried about the emphasis being placed on making more and more money …. 
Big money and amateur sport have had a volatile relationship the world over and it’s hard to 
see how it would be any different within the GAA. (McGee 2007, 60)
What ultimately was being proposed by the strategic review body was a form of governance 
that reflects the best practise in managing large organizations, which prioritises efficiency 
and foregrounds transparent and effective processes of financial management. To this end 
the stewardship model sees managers work effectively for an organization with the expressed 
aim of maximizing return for the shareholders or members (Donaldson and Davis 1994). 
Built around the suggestion that managers wish ultimately to work for the betterment of 
the organization, Donaldson and Davis (1994) argue that they should be freed from an 
essentially subservient role to assume a position on a board of directors, where they can 
control the direction of the business much more productively. This process can be assisted 
by the presence on the board of external regulators, whose role is to ensure that the fiduciary 
duty of the board is carried out to the satisfaction of its stakeholders. This remains valid in 
the case of not-for-profit organizations that occasionally believe that their responsibilities 
in respect of the organization’s membership need not be as resolutely adhered to.
Governance and the GAA in Ireland
The structure of GAA governance is important to an understanding of the stakeholder 
network of Gaelic games activity in Ireland. Essentially, this is comprised of a hierarchical 
pyramid in which representatives of the 32 county boards, that together regulate the GAA 
at a national level, form the membership of the central regulating authority, the all-powerful 
GAA Central Council. As such, there exists a potential conflict of interests whereby a select 
group of people emerge from a broader membership body only, in turn, to seek to exercise 
authority over this wider grouping. Whilst the structures of the national associations vary, 
they are largely based on wide representation of individuals, counties and provincial bod-
ies at the various levels of the games. Each of the four provincial bodies, Ulster, Munster, 
Leinster and Connacht, organizes club and county games within their own geographical 
area (and have their own staffing structures), whilst the aforementioned GAA Management 
Committee look after national competitions, including the All Ireland championships, the 
inter-provincial competitions and other all-Ireland series. The hierarchical integration of 
the elite and the grassroots of the GAA through a single system ensure that everything from 
the laws of the game to the organization of leagues and championships operates within one 
framework. The GAA’s Central Council, Management Committee and provincial councils 
effectively enjoy a monopoly position controlling the regulation and organization of Gaelic 
games activity. There is a single governing body at county level, a single council in each 
province sanctioned by the GAA and a single national authority. The rules of the GAA 
prevent Gaelic games from taking place outside their own structures on a competitive 
basis, and ensure that leagues and clubs are, theoretically, subordinate to the provincial 
and national organizations.
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This subordination is intended to recognize that in a multi-organizational context, in 
which clubs and counties compete across levels and defined regulatory areas, and with 
interdependence between those levels in terms of the development, well-being and pro-
vision of players and finance from the inter-county games right down to the grassroots, 
there should be a body that looks at the overall interests of the games at all levels. Thus, the 
provincial and national associations are routinely composed of different forms of repre-
sentative combinations of GAA figures across the various levels. These are typically male, 
middle-aged and imbued with the guiding ethos and principles of a GAA, which are often 
located in the past. The structures also reflect the belief that there is a responsibility at the 
top end of the game to redistribute revenue to other areas of the pyramid. According to the 
GAA’s strategic review document,
the continued voluntary efforts and commitment of thousands of people who play, mentor, 
coach or administer in every parish and every community throughout the country, remains 
a distinguishing feature of the GAA; its clubs have developed into a source of both personal 
and community pride and identity. (GAA, 2000, 10)
Within the GAA, there remains a strongly held belief that the elite game should continue 
to make a contribution to supporting other levels of the pyramid.
Nevertheless, divisions within the GAA and its on-going negotiations with key stakehold-
ers may act as an obstacle to radical change, and may be one reason why the organizations 
like the Gaelic Players Association (GPA), effectively a trade union for GAA players, has 
so far been unable to transform latent power into sizeable political gains in its quest for 
greater recognition of its core role as a source of revenue generation. Elite players need a 
successful and united GAA, and the need for consensus amongst a sufficient number of GAA 
members and delegates means that changes to directives pertaining to the remuneration of 
players will require broad support. Of course on a range of issues the GPA has legitimate 
grounds for protest. Any situation where the primary means of revenue production are 
inadequately compensated for their efforts is likely to create resentment and quite possibly 
lead to a withdrawal of their services. The players have common concerns such as dealing 
with a congested fixture programme, meaning an off-season is considered a luxury rather 
than a permanent arrangement, a failure to be adequately compensated for unavoidable 
absence from their full-time employment and the negotiation of commercial contracts. The 
fact that the players help drive revenue production for the GAA, which ultimately helps 
subsidize the activities of the GAA on a national level, has led to demands for more direct 
integration into the decision-making structures of the governing body. To this end the GAA 
has recently expanded its Central Council to incorporate a representative from the GPA. 
Conversely, there is a degree of distrust within the GAA about the GPA’s motives, fearing 
its agenda is to create an elitist arm of the association. Whilst the GPA denies this, given its 
present constitution and similar capacity to attract commercial sponsorship, it would be a 
natural development were the organization to pursue this at a national level.
Conclusion
In many ways the GAA is a unique sporting organization. For its entire existence of some 
130 years the association has expressed its strong belief in the amateur ideal and rejected 
any movement towards professionalism. Whilst it remained a modest, community-based 
organization such an approach proved to be very effective and it benefited enormously 
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from considerable levels of volunteerism and financial altruism. Yet, as the GAA has devel-
oped into a fully fledged, professional sporting organization it has encountered difficulty in 
retaining support for its policy on amateurism. As its central and salaried operation grew 
exponentially, it continued to employ a straightforward administrative model of governance, 
one that lacked any proper strategic underpinning or financial acumen. Whereas, in the 
past this was almost a part of the GAA’s intrinsic charm, as its central bureaucracy grew 
so too did calls for the adoption of a more professional operating strategy on the part of 
the association.
These issues were laid bare following the GAA’s own strategic review, published in 2002 
but the resonance of which is still experienced to this day. A catalogue of issues that required 
immediate attention were outlined, with the need for a more efficient and effective form of 
governance foremost amongst these. The recommendation of this article, a view supported 
by those charged with the GAA’s own review, is that a stewardship model of governance 
should be adopted by the association. This would involve a streamlining of the GAA’s Central 
Council, to be replaced by a much smaller board of directors who would be appointed on 
merit and not merely on a representative basis. This imperative is made all the more real 
when one considers the growing body of internal and external stakeholders the GAA is 
attempting to engage with. Some of these stakeholders are intent on challenging the GAA’s 
traditional modus operandi, and indeed have negotiated partial acceptance of some of their 
demands. Finally, what is noticeable (and presumably concerning for the association) is 
that some of the GAA’s fiercest critics have emerged from within its own ranks. It exists as 
a reminder that even the most benign and erstwhile organizations eventually encounter 
problems as their mode of governance becomes out-dated and ineffective in the face of 
demands placed upon it from modern day sport.
In essence, then, any balanced analysis of the regulation and governance of the GAA 
under its current arrangements suggests that whilst its grassroots membership will play 
a major role in any future developments, the GAA’s hierarchy itself is undermined by the 
nature of its own composition. The level of exclusivity and the lack of defined and coherent 
membership criteria pose problems of legitimacy and credibility. Positions of authority 
are held for considerable periods of time and even in those cases where arrangements 
of this nature are expressly prohibited; such difficulties are overcome by simply rotating 
portfolios. The GAA makes much play out of its democratic credentials, but in reality the 
reigns of power are held by a small group of influential personalities, albeit they rely on 
the passive consent of a much larger group to carry out their duties. It is unlikely that such 
an arrangement can continue to prove sustainable going forward. In turn the argument 
that this situation should be reversed and a professional board of directors put in place has 
gained considerable traction amongst the GAA’s broader constituency.
The existence of various stakeholders with power encourages caution and leads to the 
view that it is unlikely that any single actor will have a monopoly on change in the period 
ahead. The GAA, through a policy of limited dialogue and a convolute series of ‘select 
committees’, has so far managed developments by integrating players, media and corporate 
Ireland into the existing system, yet at the same time withholding genuine decision-making 
power. It remains questionable whether this strategy is sustainable in the long-term, but 
by opting for dialogue the GAA has positioned itself in direct and regular contact with 
key stakeholders. The GAA’s continued commercial and sporting control of the All Ireland 
championships means that the organization retains its central role in the regulation of the 
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sport in Ireland. Nevertheless, the latent market power of its elite players is evident. That 
being so, the inclination of stakeholders to operate (but increase their influence) within 
the established structures, means that market power is offset by the realities of modern day 
sport governance. The GAA has gradually attempted to come to terms with this transition, 
albeit it has had sporadic success in doing so. Its principal difficulty is managing a vibrant, 
professional and modern sporting body within the confines of a historically determined 
and fundamentally amateur context.
The level of stakeholder influence is further clouded by legal uncertainty regarding the 
rules of governing bodies in a self-regulatory framework. Whilst stakeholders are largely 
inclined to operate within the system, they have also succeeded in altering the system 
through recourse to outside bodies. The full workings of NGB’s and their lack of political 
and legal standing has occasionally been exposed and the GAA has proved as susceptible 
to this as any other organization. It must remain mindful of the fact that whilst at one level 
it is imbued with the right to regulate Gaelic games activity, the full extent of this capacity 
set against the law of the land often results in its autonomy being compromised. It is not 
beyond the realms of possibility that as the GAA continues to move ever increasingly in 
the direction of a fully fledged commercial sports body that it may require a more defined 
appreciation of its legal and political shortcomings. It is for this reason that a move away 
from a long-standing administrative approach to managing its affairs is long overdue. Indeed 
the imposition of a professional board of directors offers the opportunity to at least ensure 
that the GAA safeguards its current position within an increasingly congested sport and 
entertainment marketplace.
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